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ABSTRACT 
 
A panel dataset of euro area countries was used to assess the determinants of 
sovereign bond yield spreads from first quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2017. In the 
period before the financial crisis, the government bond yield spreads were mostly 
determined by the expected debt to GDP, the credit risk factor and economic growth. 
With the eruption of the financial crisis, the analysis suggests that markets have started 
to take into consideration more fundamentals to determine the price of government bond 
yield spreads, such as liquidity risk and international risk. It was also concluded that there 
is a difference between the determinants of the government bond yield spread of core and 
periphery group. 
JEL: C23, F34, G01, H50. 
Keywords: sovereign yields, panel analysis, crisis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in January of 1999, brought to life an 
integrated market, with no visible currency risk and closer coordination of monetary 
policies across euro countries. Due to this union, the public bonds issued by different 
Euro-area governments were considered by many investors as close substitutes. This 
perception originated a significant decrease in the interest spread of 10-year government 
bonds against the benchmark, the German bonds, converging between the member 
countries in less than a year after the introduction of EMU. Yet, market participants have 
never regarded bonds issued by euro-area Member States as perfect substitutes. 
Differences in yield levels across countries have indeed remained to different extents for 
different issuers and maturities, and became more sizable during the course of 2008 and 
2009. 
The global financial turmoil began in mid-2007, and reached its first climax in 
September 2008, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Fiscal imbalances expanded in 
most European Economies, with several countries breaking the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, facing excessive deficits for a prolonged period. At the end of 2008, a 
sudden rise in bond spreads relative to Germany was observed for many economies. In 
October 2008, the spread reached an unprecedented level, being higher than 100 basis 
points for the first time. The lack of a strong market reaction in the wake of these adverse 
fiscal developments has prompted people to argue that the euro and the ongoing process 
of financial integration have eliminated markets’ ability or willingness to discriminate the 
quality of national fiscal policies (Manganelli and Wolwijk, 2007). In times of heightened 
financial and economic uncertainty, investors typically have a higher preference for less 
risky and liquid assets, thereby increasing the premium for risky assets as portfolio 
composition is adjusted to the desired new equilibrium (Favero et al., 20011). If we have 
market discipline the government has the incentive to present solid economic indicators, 
otherwise markets will most likely penalize it, demanding higher yields. Governments 
have therefore to take into account these higher financing costs when planning their fiscal 
policies. Ceteris paribus, strong market discipline does not encourage governments to 
take unbalanced fiscal policies, promoting as a result fiscal discipline.  
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This unprecedented surge in the concerns of financial markets about some 
governments’ capacity to meet their future debt obligations leads to the importance to 
determine what causes the fluctuations of the government bond yield spreads. In addition 
to a higher cost of borrowing, the increase in sovereign bond yield spreads may reflect 
the fact that investors are less willing to provide funding to sovereign borrowers. 
Therefore, governments might lose the ability to access capital markets. 
Based on the finding of this study, it can be concluded that in the period before the 
financial crisis the government bond yield spreads were mostly determined by the 
expected debt to GDP, the credit risk factor and economic growth. 
With the eruption of the financial crisis, the analysis suggests that markets have 
started to take into consideration more fundamentals to determine the price of government 
bond yield spreads. International risk and the liquidity risk were two indicators that started 
to have a meaningful influence on spreads after 2009. Fiscal determinants, credit risk 
were also significant for this model. The average credit ratings while is significant in 
spread determination, after 2009 have unexpected relationship, presenting a positive sign.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related 
literature on the determinants of the euro area sovereign spreads before and during the 
European debt crisis. Section three presents and discusses the data, methodology and 
empirical results. Section four concludes. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
In the European Monetary Union, given the single monetary policy, no exchange rate 
risk and the relative integration of the national bond market, the general literature use 
three main variables as the determinants of long-term sovereign yield spreads: the 
international risk factor, credit risk and the liquidity risk.  
The international risk factor captures the level of perceived risk and its unit price. The 
empirical evidence shows that a higher (lower) value of international risk factor tends to 
cause an increase (reduction) in the government bond spread. This is empirically 
approximated using the indexes of the US stock market implied volatility or the spread 
between the yields of the corporate bonds against US treasury bills (Afonso et al., 2018, 
Hui and Chung, 2011, Beber et al., 2009).  
The second explanatory factor, the credit risk, refers to the risk of the issuer´s default, 
who may no longer be able to pay interest or/and pay back the capital. It is linked to the 
sustainability of the fiscal position. Therefore, in terms of credit risk, sovereign bond yield 
spreads should be related to each country´s public finances sustainability indicators. It is 
expected that higher (lower) value of credit risk increases (decreases) the government 
bond spread. An extensive literature has indeed concluded that markets tend to attach 
additional risk to the loosening of the fiscal position of the country (see e.g. Afonso and 
Rault, 2010, Schuknecht et al., 2010) 
Liquidity risk is another important variable that must be taken into consideration to 
understand the government bond yields. It refers to the risk of selling less liquid assets at 
worse market conditions (higher transaction costs, greater price impact) than more liquid 
ones. This variable provides therefore an indication of the depth of the sovereign bond 
market. Liquidity is particularly difficult to measure empirically, usually approximated 
using bid-ask spreads, transaction volumes and the level of or the share of a country’s 
debt in global/EMU-wide sovereign debt (see e.g. Favero et al., 2010, Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas, 2011). 
The literature on the EMU government bonds covering the period prior to the global 
financial crisis is not unanimous regarding the role of each of the three main determinants 
discussed above. However, the prevailing views can be summarized as follows: First, the 
international risk factor was important to determine spreads against Germany (see 
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Codogno et al., 2003; Favero et al., 2010, Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2007). This effect 
was particularly strong during periods of tightening international financial conditions 
(e.g. excessive current account) (see Barrios et al., 2009) as well as for countries with 
high levels of public debt (see Codogno et al., 2003). As Hui and Chung, (2011) show, 
the VIX index explains an additional 4.3% of the implied volatility; however, it is only 
marginally significant. As per Arghyrou and Kontonikas, (2011), VIX is not significant 
as a determinant of spreads in any country, thereby suggesting a weak link between 
spreads and global financial risk during the pre-crisis period. 
Second, credit risk was significant determinant of the government bond yield spread, 
as suggested by Bernoth et al. (2004), Manganelli and Wolswijk, (2007) and Gerlach et 
al. (2010). Bernoth and Wolff, (2008) and Schuknecht et al. (2010) interpret these 
findings as evidence that the Stability and Growth Pact was a credible mechanism 
imposing fiscal discipline among EMU members. The Pact might reduce monitoring by 
financial markets of fiscal developments if market participants are confident that peer 
pressure and sanctions will lead governments to reduce the budgetary position. Any 
excess over 3% of GDP would only be considered as a temporary concern, not giving rise 
to a major disruption in the financial markets. Manganelli and Wolswijk, (2007), find that 
the penalties imposed by markets were insufficiently high to encourage EMU 
governments to change unsustainable fiscal policies. 
Finally, there is a controversial opinion on the role played by liquidity. On the one 
hand, Bernoth et al. (2004) and Schuknecht et al. (2010) conclude that liquidity is not a 
significant determinant of the sovereign yield spread in euro area countries. Codogno et 
al. (2003) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas, (2011) also indicate a very limited effect of 
liquidity. On the other hand, Pagano and Von Thadden, (2004), Jankowitsch et al. (2002) 
Gomez-Puig, (2006) and Beber et al. (2009) argue in favor of a more prominent liquidity 
effect. Liquidity effects are found to be higher during periods of tightening financial 
conditions as the potential cost associated with investing in an illiquid, creditworthy asset 
is higher than the cost associated with investing in a liquid, yet less creditworthy asset 
during volatile market periods (Beber et al., 2009). In contrast, Favero et al. (2010) finds 
that during periods of high aggregate risk the effect of liquidity on yield differentials is 
not significantly different from zero. 
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When it comes to the crisis period, there is a broad consensus in the literature that the 
observed widening of the EMU spreads is mainly driven by the increase of global risk 
factor. In this process, the role of domestic banking sectors is crucial, as suggested by 
Gerlach et al. (2010) and Acharya et al. (2011). Global banking risk has been transformed 
into sovereign risk as shortages in banking liquidity restricted credit to the private sector 
causing economic recession and increasing fiscal imbalances.  
With national banking sectors having different degrees of exposure to global financial 
conditions, the increase in the global risk factor causes a heterogeneous impact on 
national spreads. Gerlach et al. (2010), Schuknecht et al. (2010) and Hui and Chang 
(2011) among others, established the importance of the global risk factor during the crisis 
period and its impact on the latter through the financial sector. Haugh and others (2009) 
have shown that the effects of fiscal variables on yield spreads are likely to be amplified 
through their interaction with risk aversion.    
Beber and others (2009), Manganelli and Wolswijk, (2007), Afonso et al. (2018) and 
Arghyrou et al. (2011) find that liquidity is a significant variable in explaining spreads 
and that the liquidity premiums tend to be high when interest rates are high. As per Barrios 
et al. (2009) liquidity played a role in explaining the evolution of yield spread for the 
majority of countries, but in spite of the strong deterioration in the liquidity condition in 
the Austrian and Portuguese government bond market in the crisis period, the liquidity 
variable is not significant.  
In the research carried out by Barbosa and Costa (2010), they found that the influence 
of credit risk and liquidity premiums augmented both in absolute terms in the period 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Between January 2007 and August 2008, 
the increase in spreads was determined by enhanced risk aversion in financial markets. In 
the months following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the risk premium in financial 
markets continued to contribute to a widening of spreads, although it was no longer the 
main factor behind the changes in spreads. During that period, most countries witnessed 
a significant raise in the liquidity premium and, to a lesser extent, in the credit risk 
premium. Credit risk and liquidity are relative concepts, particularly in the context of 
flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity. Indeed, an investor considering shifting funds 
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from one asset to another necessarily has to take into account the relative credit quality 
and liquidity of the two assets at a point in time (Beber et al., 2009). 
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3. ANALYSIS 
3.1 Methodology 
The dependent variable of the model is the 10-year government bond yield spread 
versus Germany, , where i presents the 10 countries of the model and t is the specific 
period.  
 
(1)         𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
                           𝛽6𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Following Afonso et al. (2015), to regard for the endogeneity between spreads and 
the explanatory variables, the equation (1) was estimated using the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) method with cross-section weight. This methodology accounts for the 
cross-section heteroscedasticity.  
Equation comprises the lagged spread, , to look upon the spread persistence 
(Afonso et al., 2015). Moreover, the inclusion of the lagged spread has the benefit of 
decreasing the omitted variable bias (Hallerberg and Wolf, 2008). 
  is Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, that is adopted to reflect 
the international risk factor, the variable employed by several previous studies (Beber et 
al, 2009, Afonso et al., 2015) It measures the “risk-neutral” expected stock market 
variance for the US S&P500 contracts, computed from the panel of option prices. It is 
also known as the “fear index” for financial markets as VIX tends to spike during market 
turmoil periods. As aforementioned before, it is expected to observe an increase 
(reduction) in the government bond spreads after a rise (decline) in the value of the 
international risk factor.  
 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 denotes the 10-year government bond bid-ask spread. This variable is used to 
measure the bond market liquidity. Higher (lower) value of this spread indicates the fall 
(increase) in liquidity, what will consequently lead to an increase (decrease) in 
government bond yield spreads. Several authors also have opted for the bid-ask spread in 
their studies to capture the liquidity effect in the EMU sovereign bond market. Among 
them are Barrios et al. (2009), Favero et al. (2010) and Gerlach et al. (2010). 
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 and  are considered as the variables reflecting governments´ fiscal 
stances, expected government budget balance-to-GDP ratio and the expected government 
debt-to-GDP ratio, respectively, both measured as a differential versus Germany. The use 
of expected, as opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with previous studies on the 
determinants of spreads (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011, Afonso et al., 2015). These 
variables provide a proxy for the credit quality with the expected fiscal deterioration 
implying higher risk. We expect a higher (lower) value for the expected budget balance 
to reduce (increase) spreads, while higher (lower) expected public debt cause an increase 
(reduction) in spreads. 
 is the log of the real effective exchange rate against Germany, our sample 
countries´ main trading partner. This variable capture credit risk that comes from general 
macroeconomic disequilibrium and the external competitiveness (Afonso et al., 2015). 
An increase (reduction) in denotes real effective exchange rate appreciation 
(depreciation), which is expected to increase (reduce) spreads.  
 is the annual growth of industrial production difference versus Germany. This 
variable is used as a proxy for the effect of the economic growth on spreads, as the 
sovereign debt becomes riskier during periods of economic slowdowns (Bernoth et al., 
2004). We expect an increase (decrease) in growth to improve (deteriorate) credit 
worthiness reducing (increasing) government bond spreads. 
Thereafter estimating the baseline model given by equation (1) we extend it by adding 
variables which purpose is to capture further insights of the movements of government 
bond spreads within the EMU.  
 accounts for the role of sovereign credit ratings on government 
bond yield spreads. To build a ratings database with sovereign rating, attributed by the 
three main rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings to each country the method 
of Afonso et al. (2012) was used. The ratings were grouped in 17 categories by putting 
together the few observations below B-, which are given the value one, while AAA 
observations receive the value 171. This allows to analyses the effect of credit ratings 
announcements on spreads. In a fully efficient market, credit ratings should not affect 
                                                 
1 The Table A2 can be seen on the appendix. 
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bonds´ prices, so their coefficient should be zero. However, in case if the markets are 
efficient only in the semi-strong form, credit ratings may be treated by markets as relevant 
information. A raise (fall) in the rating position will decrease (increase) spreads. 
To capture the possibility of no-linear effect of expected fiscal performance on 
government bond spreads, we use the expected debt-to-GDP differential versus Germany 
in the second power,  (Bernoth et al., 2004, and Afonso et al., 2015). 
 
(2)        𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
                                          𝛽6𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
After the estimation of equations (1) and (2) and checking for the relevance of the 
determinants of the government yield spreads presented by the both regressions, under 
the assumption that these relationships have remained stable over time, we proceed by 
accounting for the possible structural changes during our sample period.  The period of 
analysis has at least two structural brakes that affected the government bond yield spreads 
brought up on the studies on the subject:  the introduction of the euro that came into 
existence on 1 January 1999 and the start of the sovereign credit crises in 2009. As per 
above, two structural brakes will be included in the relationship between spreads and their 
potential determinants, using slope dummy variables. The first dummy variable will be 
D1999.Q1, it aims to capture the effect of the introduction of the euro. The second dummy 
variable is D2009.Q2 that intend to capture the sovereign credit crisis and its aftermath. 
3.2 Data and stylized facts 
The sample consists of quarterly data on sovereign bond yields and their fundamental 
determinants for the period from the first quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2017. The 
sample consists of 10 European monetary union economies: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain2. As was mentioned 
previously, most of the variables are expressed in relation to Germany. The option of 
using Germany as the reference country is justified by the fact that the German 
government bonds have reinforced their safe heaven and benchmark status during the 
                                                 
2 We exclude Luxembourg, where the outstanding government debt and the associated market are very 
small, as well as the countries that have joined the euro since 2008 (Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
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current crisis, because of their relatively high credit quality and liquidity. The data sources 
and definitions of the variables can be seen in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
FIGURE 1 - 10-years government bond yield spread for 10 EMU countries along the 
period 1995-2017 
 
Source: Reutters 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the 10-year euro area government bond yield spreads 
versus Germany from 1995 until 2017. As can be seen, preceding the introduction of the 
euro there were some differences between spreads, but following 1999 the spreads are 
starting to converge. This convergence can be explained by the exchange rate risk 
elimination and also due to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact that were perceived 
by the markets as trustworthy. Nevertheless, in the 2009, with the outbreak of the financial 
crisis, some of the economies experienced a large increase in their spreads versus 
Germany.  
 Figure 2 and 3 display the deterioration of the fiscal positions of the sample countries 
with the outburst of the sovereign debt crisis in early 2009. The fiscal deterioration means 
lower tax revenues and fiscal cost that government faces of having to support the financial 
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sector. As can be observed on the Figure 3, in all the sample countries, the expected debt 
as a percentage to GDP started to decrease only beginning in the 2016. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the evolution of the credit ratings of the sample countries for 
the study period. The data that was used comes from the tree main rating agencies, 
Standard and Poor´s, Moody´s and Fitch. Following the existing literature on ratings (see 
Afonso et al., 2012) the sovereign credit rating scores are transformed into the linear scale 
presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. For the periphery countries (Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, Greece and Italy), after the significant deterioration of fiscal position the 
downgrade of the ratings was followinghad been undertaken by credit rating agencies. 
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FIGURE 3: Expected budget balance as percentage of GDP 
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Source: Datastream 
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FIGURE 4: Expected debt as percentage of GDP 
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Source: Eurostat 
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FIGURE 5: Average credit ratings 
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Source: Trading Economics 
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3.3 Measuring core-periphery effect 
While there is a difference between the determinants of government bond yield 
spreads for the pre- and post-crisis period, there is also a difference of the spread 
determinants between core and periphery group countries. As the core group countries 
are considered: Austria, Belgium, France, Finland and the Netherlands. Referring to the 
periphery group countries, those are Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  
FIGURE 6: 10-years government bond yield speeds core-periphery groups 
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Source: Reutters 
Following the onset of the global financial crisis, as per Figure 6, the spreads of all 
countries that are analyzed in this study started to increase. The government bond yield 
spreads of the core group have been relatively stable, albeit at superior levels compared 
to the pre-crisis period. Meanwhile, the spreads of the periphery group, in the aftermath 
of the Lehman Brothers crisis, have been on an ascending path.  
At the Table I are the results of the estimation of the equation (1) and (2) only for the 
core countries. All the variables have theoretically expected signs, except the average 
credit ratings. In first specification (equation (1)), can be noted that from all variables 
only three are significant for the model: international risk, market liquidity and industrial 
production. In more detailed equation (2), with average ratings and expected debt to GDP 
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in the second power, the significance of the variables from the first specification, remains 
the same, adding the nonlinear effect of the expected fiscal performance to the 
determinants of the spreads. In both specifications, fiscal performance and credit risk are 
not significant, so it can be concluded that for the core group countries these factors are 
not priced. 
TABLE I: MODELING BOND YIELD SPREADS FOR CORE GROUP, 2SLS 
 
 
1 2 3 
SPRIT 0.733248***  
(0,0278) 
0.731850*** 
(0.0277) 
0.740712*** 
(0.0271) 
VIXT 0.002768*** 
(0,0008) 
0.003048*** 
(0.0008) 
0.003114*** 
(0.0008) 
LIQIT  -6.542825*** 
(1.0298) 
-6.382091*** 
(1.0330) 
-6.127069*** 
(0.9074) 
BALANCEIT -0.002984 
(0.0026) 
-0.003337 
(0.0027) 
 
DEBTIT 0.000686 
(0.0016) 
0.000915 
(0.0018) 
 
EXRTIT 0.171593 
(0.1739) 
0.101010 
(0.1909) 
 
INDPRIT -0.003653** 
(0.0019) 
-0.004757** 
(0.0019) 
-0.005459*** 
(0.0018) 
AVERAGERATINGSIT   0.094418 
(0.0853) 
 
DEBTIT2   -0.000633** 
(0.0002) 
-0.000656*** 
(0.0002) 
N*T 460 460 460 
ADJ-R2 0,65 0,66 0,66 
STANDARD ERROR OF REGRESSION 0,154 0,151 1,52 
Note: The regression model is estimated over the time period 1995.Q1-20017.Q4 (T=92). The panel 
members include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, (N=5). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
fixed effect panel estimated, which account for endogeneity, are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS 
estimations are the second lag of the dependent variable and the first three lagged values of the independent 
variables. Column 1 reports the results of the equation (1), the baseline model, while Column 2 presents 
the results of the equation (2), from the fully specified model. Column 3 presents only statistically 
significant variables from the equation (2). Standard errors in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** indicate 
significance at the 1% and, 5% level respectively. 
Next, the determinants of the government bond yield spreads for the group of 
periphery countries will be analyzed. In Table II are presented the outputs of both 
equations. The results of the equation (1) show that not all variables have economically 
expected signs. The industrial production is significant but has a positive sign. As can be 
seen, both indicators of fiscal stance are significant for the periphery group countries. The 
liquidity is also priced by the markets in this group. 
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Moving to the equation (2), the variables that were significant in the previous analyzes 
are also significant in this specification. Now only added average credit ratings factor 
presents not economically expected sign being significant. While it is expected that when 
there is an improvement of the rating position, the spread will decrease the multiplier has 
the positive sign. It can concluded that there is a nonlinear effect of expected fiscal 
performance on the government bond yield spread. 
 
TABLE II: MODELLING BOND YIELD SPREADS FOR PERIPHERY GROUP, 2SLS 
  1 2 3 
SPRIT 0.842406*** 
(0.0208) 
0.880328*** 
(0.0216) 
0.886634*** 
(0.0201) 
VIXT 0.001370 
(0.0034) 
0.003206 
(0.032) 
 
LIQIT  -2.435202*** 
(0.2139) 
-2.519990*** 
(0.2304) 
-2.486977*** 
(0.2217) 
BALANCEIT -0.041391*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.029558*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.030122*** 
(0.0067) 
DEBTIT 0.014275*** 
(0.0042) 
0.010212** 
(0.0050) 
0.011900*** 
(0.0039) 
EXRTIT 0.364832 
(0.3787) 
0.224394 
(0.3544) 
 
INDPRIT 0.011547*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.000968 
(0.0043) 
 
AVERAGERATINGSIT 
 
0.407730*** 
(0.0669) 
0.402310*** 
(0.06625) 
DEBTIT2 
 
0.000565*** 
(0.0002) 
0.000553*** 
(0.0002) 
N*T 460 460 460 
ADJ-R2 0,84 0,85 0,85 
STANDARD ERROR OF REGRESSION 0,775 0,76 0,758 
Note: The regression model is estimated over the time period 1995.Q1-20017.Q4 (T=92). The panel 
members include: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, (N=5). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed 
effect panel estimated, which account for endogeneity, are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS 
estimations are the second lag of the dependent variable and the first three lagged values of the independent 
variables. Column 1 reports the results of the equation (1), the baseline model, while Column 2 presents 
the results of the equation (2), from the fully specified model. Column 3 presents only statistically 
significant variables from the equation (2). Standard errors in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
Comparing two groups, it can be observed that in both cases the liquidity is priced by 
the markets. The nonlinear effect of expected fiscal performance on government bond 
spreads exists in either of the groups. While in core group countries markets don´t look 
at the financial stance of the economy in the periphery group both of them are priced. For 
the periphery group there are more factors that are taken into account to determine the 
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spreads it can be because those countries are considered as more risky compared to the 
core group. 
3.4 Panel estimation results 
To begin the analyzes of the benchmark model (equation (1)) and then its extension 
(equation (2)) were estimated for the full sample period for all countries. The results are 
reported in Table III. 
TABLE III: MODELLING BOND YIELD SPREADS, 2SLS 
  1 2  3 
SPRIT 0.819561*** 
(0.0176) 
0.809712*** 
(0.0184) 
0.82231*** 
(0.0170) 
VIXT 0.045183** 
(0.0.0211) 
-0.416368 
(0.0202) 
0.127105*** 
(0.0202) 
LIQIT  -2.589270*** 
(0.2116) 
-0.001837 
(0.2677) 
 
BALANCEIT -0.006592** 
(0.0027) 
0.016627*** 
(0.0019) 
 
DEBTIT 0.002966* 
(0.0016) 
0.384670*** 
(0.0036) 
0.017936*** 
(0.0035) 
EXRTIT 0.047816 
(0.1689) 
0.129925*** 
(0.1531) 
0.332079** 
(0.1508) 
INDPRIT -0.001779 
(0.0020) 
-0.003541** 
(0.0018) 
-0.003289* 
(0.0018) 
AVERAGERATINGSIT 
 
-0.451826*** 
(0.0551) 
-0.445376*** 
(0.0551) 
DEBTIT2 
 
0.001110*** 
(0.0001) 
0.000994*** 
(0.0001) 
N*T 920 920 920 
ADJ-R2 0,79 0,79 0,79 
STANDARD ERROR OF REGRESSION 0,522 0,606 0,611 
Note: The regression model is estimated over the time period 1995.Q1-20017.Q4 (T=92). The panel 
members include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain (N=10). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed effect panel estimated, which account for 
endogeneity, are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second lag of the dependent 
variable and the first two lagged values of the independent variables. Column 1 reports the results of the 
equation (1), the base line model, while Column 2 presents the results of the equation (2), from the fully 
specified model. Column 3 presents only statistically significant variables from equation (2). Standard 
errors in brackets. The asterisks ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
The coefficients that were obtained, present all the theoretically expected signs 
defined in the previous section. In both specifications, spreads appear to be highly 
persistent. Regarding the significance of the variables, the liquidity is significant in the 
baseline model but then it is insignificant in the augmented model of equation (2). As for 
the expected fiscal fundamentals, they both appear to be significant in both specifications. 
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The squared debt is significant; therefore, there is a nonlinear effect of expected fiscal 
performance on government spreads. 
TABLE IV: MODELLING BOND YIELD SPREADS WITH SLOPE-DUMMIES, 2SLS 
Note: The regression model is estimated over the time period 1995.Q1-20017.Q4 (T=92). The panel 
members include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
  1 2 3 
SPRIT 0.832579*** 
(0.0189) 
0.861792*** 
(0.0195) 
0.852227*** 
(0.0169) 
VIXT -0.003937*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.003656*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.002684** 
(0.0011) 
VIXT *D1999.Q1 0.001318 
(0.0015) 
0.001764 
(0.0015) 
 
VIXT *D2009.Q2 0.006755*** 
(0.0012) 
0.006809*** 
(0.0012) 
0.006693*** 
(0.0008) 
LIQIT 0.469154 
(0.3823) 
0.464356 
(0.3940) 
 
LIQIT *D1999.Q1 -2.547036 
(2.0834) 
-2.475530 
(2.0795) 
 
LIQIT *D2009.Q2 -2.677692*** 
(0.3651) 
-2.570140*** 
(0.3777) 
-2.254807*** 
(0.2118) 
BALANCEIT -0.006290*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.005501*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.005062** 
(0.0021) 
BALANCEIT *D1999.Q1 -0.000547 
(0.0037) 
-0.000223 
(0.0036) 
 
BALANCEIT *D2009.Q2 -0.032600*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.030396*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.027765*** 
(0.0057) 
DEBTIT -0.024567*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.021571*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.018823*** 
(0.0031) 
DEBTIT *D1999.Q1 0.022370*** 
(0.0044) 
0.018915*** 
(0.0044) 
0.015213*** 
(0.0041) 
DEBTIT *D2009.Q2 0.022568*** 
(0.0044) 
0.025509*** 
(0.0043) 
0.021576*** 
(0.0039) 
EXRTIT 0.712844** 
(0.3015) 
0.353187 
(0.3062) 
 
EXRTIT *D1999.Q1 -1.230366** 
(0.4916) 
-0.870774* 
(0.4779) 
-0.724097** 
(0.3313) 
EXRTIT *D2009.Q2 -2.842641*** 
(0.7171) 
-2.031196*** 
(0.7286) 
-1.439392*** 
(0.5451) 
INDPRIT 0.003905 
(0.0027) 
0.002614 
(0.0026) 
 
INDPRIT *D1999.Q1 -0.010488*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.009990*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.008676*** 
(0.0035) 
INDPRIT *D2009.Q2 0.001416 
(0.0035) 
0.004586 
(0.0038) 
 
AVERAGERATINGSIT 
 
-0.155345 
(0.2141) 
 
AVERAGERATINGSIT *D1999.Q1 
 
0.161823 
(0.2898) 
 
AVERAGERATINGSIT *D2009.Q2 
 
0.440257** 
(0.2206) 
0.319205*** 
(0.0572) 
N*T 920 920 920 
ADJ-R2 0,82 0,83 0,83 
STANDARD ERROR OF REGRESSION 0,47 0,461 0,467 
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Spain (N=10). The slope-dummy variables included to differentiate between 3 periods: D1999.Q1 and 
D2009.Q2.Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed effect panel estimated, which account for endogeneity, 
are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second lag of the dependent variable 
and the first two lagged values of the independent variables. Column 1 reports the results of the equation 
(1), the base line model, while Column 2 presents the results of the equation (2), from the fully specified 
model. Column 3 presents only statistically significant variables from equation (2). Standard errors in 
brackets. The asterisks ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
The proxy for the economic growth and the credit risk, both versus Germany, are 
significant in the second specification while international risk factor appears to be 
insignificant. As per this estimation, average credit ratings are also priced by the markets. 
To examine how the determinant of spreads change in the different periods of time 
the model is now expanded to analyze the results for the periods before and after 
sovereign crisis. To that end, the estimation of the equations is repeated accounting for 
slope-dummies, differentiating between three periods, namely, preceding the introduction 
of the euro (1995.Q1 – 1998.Q4), the period before the sovereign credit crisis (1999.Q1 
– 2009.Q1) and finally the period after the sovereign credit crisis (2009.Q2 – 2017.Q4). 
Table IV reports the 2SLS estimation results. 
Column (1) presents the results from the baseline model described by equation (1), 
including the time slope-dummies. Comparing to the previous outcome in this 
specification spread´s persistence is even higher. During the pre-crisis period, it can be 
seen that not so many variables were significant. As per results the credit risk factor, 
expected debt to GDP and the industrial production are main determinants of the spreads. 
Regarding the period after first quarter of 2009, overall the liquidity risk, both 
determinants of fiscal stance, credit risk, economic growth rate and international risk are 
considered as the determinants of the government bond yield spreads. These results go in 
line with several previous studies. 
Column (2) adds into the empirical specification the average credit ratings. In efficient 
markets and as long as the credit ratings are determinant by the publicly available 
information they should not be statistically significant determinants of spreads. The credit 
ratios are measured by a simple average rating scores provided by each of the three main 
rating agencies, namely Standard and Poor´s, Moody´s and Fitch. This method is used 
based on the study made by Afonso et al. (2012). 
Table IV shows that credit rating are not significant prior the sovereign crisis, but they 
are significant after it with a positive sign. The inclusion of the credit ratings results in 
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small improvement of the explanatory power of the model. Regarding the other variables, 
we can see that the variables that were considered by the markets in the previous equation 
remain significant in this specification.  
Finally, column (3) presents the results from a parsimonious specification obtained 
by moving from the general specification presented in column (2) towards a more specific 
model including only statistically significant variables. Based on the finding of this study, 
it can be concluded that in the period before the financial crisis the government bond yield 
spreads were mostly determined by the expected debt to GDP, the credit risk factor and 
economic growth. 
With the eruption of the financial crisis, the analysis suggests that markets have 
started to take into consideration more fundamentals to determine the price of government 
bond yield spreads. International risk and the liquidity risk were two indicators that started 
to have a meaningful influence on spreads after 2009. Fiscal determinants, credit risk 
were also significant for this model. The average credit ratings while is significant in 
spread determination, after 2009 have unexpected relationship, presenting a positive sign. 
Overall, with the inclusion of the structural breaks, the model offers the superior 
information regarding the determinants of sovereign bond spreads in the euro area, 
especially for the period after 2009. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this study were estimated the determinants of the government bond yields spreads 
in the euro area. The panel data of ten euro area countries was employed (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) using 
quarterly data from 1995 to 2017. We investigated extended set of potential spreads’ 
determinants such as fiscal fundamentals, international risk, credit risk, liquidity 
conditions and credit ratings. After assessment of  the benchmark model, the augmented 
equation was studied accounting for the structural breaks with two slope dummies 
differentiating between three periods, namely preceding the introduction of the euro 
(1995.Q1 – 1998.Q4), the period before the sovereign credit crisis (1999.Q1 – 2009.Q1) 
and finally the period after the sovereign credit crisis (2009.Q2 – 2017.Q4).  
Based on the finding of this study, it can be concluded that in the period before the 
financial crisis the government bond yield spreads were mostly determined by the 
expected debt to GDP, the credit risk factor and economic growth. 
With the eruption of the financial crisis, the analysis suggests that markets have 
started to take into consideration more fundamentals to determine the price of government 
bond yield spreads. International risk and the liquidity risk were two indicators that started 
to have a meaningful influence on spreads after 2009. Fiscal determinants, credit risk 
were also significant for this model. The average credit ratings while is significant in 
spread determination, after 2009 have unexpected relationship, presenting a positive sign. 
Looking further ahead, greater market discrimination across countries may provide 
higher incentives for governments to attain and maintain sustainable public finances. 
Since even small changes in bond yields have a noticeable impact on government outlays, 
market discipline may act as an important deterrent against deteriorating public finances.
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APPENDICES 
TABLE A1: DATA DEFINITION AND SOURCES 
Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
spr 10-year bond yield spread against Germany bond Reutters 
vix Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index  Datastreem 
liq 10-year government bond bid-ask spread ECB 
balance government budget balance-to-GDP ratio Datastreem 
debt  government debt-to-GDP ratio Eurostat 
exrt Real Efective Exchange rate  OCDE 
indpr annual growth of industrial production IMF 
averageratings Credit ratings (Average of Fitch, Moody´s, S&P) Trading Economics 
TABLE A2: S&P, MOODY’S AND FITCH RATING SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Afonso et al., 2012 
Characterization 
of debt and
issuer
Linear 
transformation
S&P Moody´s Fitch
Highest quality AAA Aaa AAA 17
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16
AA Aa2 AA 15
AA- Aa3 AA- 14
A+ A1 A+ 13
A A2 A 12
A- A3 A- 11
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10
BBB Baa2 BBB 9
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8
Likely to fulfil 
obligations,
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7
BB Ba2 BB 6
ongoing 
uncertainty 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5
B+ B1 B+ 4
B B2 B 3
B- B3 B- 2
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
CCC Caa2 CCC
CCC- Caa3 CCC-
Near default 
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SD C DDD
D DD
D
Ratings
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Very high credit 
risk 
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Default 
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